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Reducing the cost of remitting is one of the targets within 
the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG 10). A key 
factor that causes migrants to use informal channels when 
sending money back home is the high cost of transfer-
ring funds through formal channels. This study examines 
whether and to what extent the reduction in the cost of send-
ing remittances increases the flow of remittances to devel-
oping countries, and whether larger amounts are remitted 
when the cost per transaction decreases (the so- called scale 
effect). It uses bilateral data on remittance flows and ex-
ploits a novel dataset covering transaction costs for 30 send-
ing and 75 receiving countries for the period 2011– 2017. A 
gravity model of remittance flows is estimated using panel 
data and instrumental variable techniques to address endo-
geneity issues. We find that transaction cost is a significant 
predictor of the volume of formal remittances. A 1% de-
crease in the cost of remitting USD 200 leads to about a 
1.6% increase in remittances. This association is robust to 
the different models and techniques employed. The find-
ings suggest that policies designed to increase formal re-
mittances need to focus on decreasing the cost of remitting 
through formal channels.
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1 |  INTRODUCTION
Remittances represent one of the largest sources of foreign exchange earnings for low- and middle- 
income countries (LMICs). For many countries, these flows exceed the flows of foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) and official development aid (ODA). The developing world has witnessed rapid growth in 
the recorded flows of remittances, which in 2018 amounted to USD 529 billion, up from around USD 
342 billion in 2010 (World Bank, 2019a). According to official figures, remittance flows to LMICs 
have grown by 54% compared to 2010. These figures are probably underestimated, since a large pro-
portion of transfers are made through informal channels such as hundi, hawala, etc. The amount of 
informal remittances could be around 50% or more of that recorded in the balance of payment statis-
tics (Freund & Spatafora, 2008).
Given the importance of remittances for developing countries, understanding how to bring down 
the cost of remitting is of interest for academics and policymakers alike (Beck & Martínez Pería, 
2011; Kakhkharov et al., 2017; Ratha et al., 2018). Transaction cost is not usually an important issue 
for large financial flows (for instance, those involved in international trade, FDI or development assis-
tance), as charges tend to be a negligible proportion of the total amount transferred. For remittances, 
however, transaction costs are often high in relative terms. Remittance service providers in the formal 
sector usually charge fees of 10%– 15% of the principal amount to handle the small transfers typically 
sent by poor migrants (Ratha, 2006). This cost puts a financial burden both on the migrants who remit 
and on the recipient, who consequently benefits less from their overseas family member's efforts. On 
the supply side, major international banks tend to focus on high- value remittance services rather than 
those tailored to migrant workers (Solimano, 2003; Ratha & Riedberg, 2005). In addition, poor immi-
grants may feel uneasy about using a bank for remittance services and tend to prefer smaller financial 
institutions, money transfer operators (MTOs) or informal services, such as the hawala system, rela-
tives, friends, transport companies, etc.
Bringing down the cost of remitting is beneficial for a number of reasons: it increases the funds 
available to migrants and members of their households who stay behind and could contribute to the 
development of the migrant's country of origin1 it helps increase flows through formal channels, espe-
cially banks, thereby contributing to the receiving country's foreign account balance; and it helps im-
prove financial access for the poor, thereby expanding the formal financial sector (Beck & Martínez 
Pería, 2011; Freund & Spatafora, 2008). Reducing costs does not necessarily mean squeezing the 
profits of the remittance service providers; indeed, the cost of providing those services often depends 
on external factors (market structure, level of competition, migrant stock). Lower prices, moreover, 
would lead to more frequent transactions by remitters, thereby offering increased volume to the ser-
vice providers (Freund & Spatafora, 2008; Ratha, 2006).
In recent years, there has been increasing interest among multilateral institutions— such as the 
World Bank, IMF, UN— in formalising remittances. An important factor that causes migrants to use 
informal channels is the high cost of transferring funds through formal channels (Gibson et al., 2006; 
Yang, 2011). The average cost of transferring USD 200 to developing countries remained at 7% in the 
first quarter of 2019, about the same level as in previous quarters (World Bank, 2019). This is more 
than double the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) target of 3% to be achieved by the year 2030. 
The cost of remittance services can vary substantially, by region and transfer methods. For instance, 
the cost is the lowest in South Asia, while sub- Saharan Africa continues to have the highest average 
cost (World Bank, 2019b). Banks are the most expensive routes for sending remittances, with an 
 1It is important to mention that there is a body of research indicating that remittances may not contribute to the economic 
development of recipient economies (see, for example, Barajas et al. 2009; Siddique et al. 2012).
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average cost of 10.9% in Q1 2019, while post offices are cheaper with a cost of 7.6% in the same pe-
riod. Reducing the cost of remitting is an important policy objective, which can help to increase the 
contribution of remittances to the formal economy, enhance financial inclusion and increase the net 
income of receiving households. Literature on the cost of remitting and remittance inflows is not con-
clusive. A number of studies incorporate geographical distance as a proxy for the cost of remitting in 
order to overcome the paucity of data on remittance cost. Greater distance between countries is asso-
ciated with increased costs of sending money, thus negatively affecting remittance inflows (Frankel, 
2011; Lueth & Ruiz- Arranz, 2008; McCracken et al., 2017). However, De Sousa and Duval (2010) 
report the opposite result: they find a significant positive relationship between geographical distance 
and remittances. The authors argue that this result can be explained by the loan repayment hypothe-
sis2. One issue with the above literature is that using geographical distance, a variable that is time- 
invariant in nature, to proxy transaction cost does not allow the researcher to consider technological 
changes and financial innovations that have made remitting more convenient. Likewise, it does not 
account for migration concentration: corridors with a greater network of migrants and higher compe-
tition for remittance services exhibit consistently lower costs than others (Beck & Martínez Pería, 
2011) indicating a lower level of information friction that further reduces the transaction cost of send-
ing remittances.
Taking a different perspective, Ahmed and Martínez- Zarzoso (2016) and Kakhkharov et al. (2017) 
focus on the cost of remitting for specific recipients, with data on remittances spanning the period 
from 2003 to 2013/2014. As expected, they find that transaction cost negatively affects the volume of 
remittances. Whereas the former study focuses exclusively on remittances sent to Pakistan, the latter 
considers remittances received in 12 post- Soviet economies. The results lack external validity given 
their national and regional focus. In terms of methodology, a one- side gravity model— with only one 
recipient country— is estimated in Ahmed and Martínez- Zarzoso, (2016) meaning it is not possible to 
properly account for multilateral resistance factors, while Kakhkharov et al. (2017) estimate basic 
panel data models at the country level with fewer than 100 observations. To address the limitations 
that these studies have in terms of methodology, scope and data used, this study uses bilateral data on 
remittance flows and exploits a global dataset of transaction costs for 30 sending nations and 75 re-
ceiving countries for the period 2011– 2017. Employing an instrumental variable (IV) design, this 
paper examines the question of whether and to what extent the cost of remittances reduces the flow of 
formal remittances to developing countries3.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, this paper is the first to estimate the effect of trans-
action cost on remittances using a global sample of countries, thereby departing from previous studies 
that were more limited in scope (Ahmed & Martínez- Zarzoso, 2016; Mookerjee & Roberts, 2011; 
among others) or only had a direct measure of transaction costs for a single year (Freund & Spatafora, 
2008). Second, we employ a number of external instruments à la Altonji and Card (1991) and Card 
(2001) to tackle potential endogeneity between the volume of remittances and transfer fees. We instru-
ment the cost of remitting with initial origin- specific migrant concentration interacted with indicators 
of financial access and the speed of transferring funds.
 2This hypothesis states that if the cost of migration were borne by the family, remittances could be considered as a loan 
repayment.
 3As pointed out by an anonymous referee, it is virtually impossible to know whether transaction costs reduce total 
remittances, given that it is difficult to estimate informal remittances (even formal remittances are hard to estimate with 
precision). It could also be the case that remittance senders have a target amount they would like or need to remit and hence 
only the flow of remittances through formal rather than informal channels is affected by the cost.
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides an overview of the existent 
literature on transaction cost and remittance inflows, including the role and interpretation of the geo-
graphical distance variable in these models. Section 3 outlines the gravity model of remittances and 
discusses data sources. Section 4 presents the estimation results and Section 5 outlines the results of a 
number of robustness tests. Finally, Section 6 summarises the results and presents some policy- related 
conclusions.
2 |  LITERATURE REVIEW
The existing literature on the decision to remit is largely comprised of microeconometric studies. The 
distinctions between the migrant's motives for the remittance decision, such as personal (altruism, 
self- interest or strategic motives) and familial arrangements (insurance and loan repayment), have 
been studied in great detail (Azizi, 2019; Carling, 2008; Rapoport & Docquier, 2006; Ruiz & Vargas- 
Silva, 2009; Schiopu & Siegfried, 2006). These different motives provide a rigorous justification for 
the macroeconomic model estimated subsequently. A migrant with altruistic motives sends money to 
financially support his/her family back home (Anwar & Mughal, 2012; Johnson & Whitelaw, 1974; 
Lucas & Stark, 1985). Migrant remittances can also be considered the result of an implicit contract 
between the members of the migrant household. For instance, a migrant may remit money to pay back 
the implicit loan taken to cover the cost of the migration process and the spending on education and 
training incurred by his/her household (Ilahi & Jafarey, 1999; Johnson & Whitelaw, 1974; Lucas & 
Stark, 1985; Stark & Lucas, 1988). The money sent by the migrant can also be due to exchange mo-
tives. If the migrant's stay- behind family members take care of the migrant's children, physical assets 
and other financial and social interests, he/she may remit money to pay for these services rendered 
(Cox, 1987; Cox et al., 1998). Finally, a migrant aspiring to a share of the family inheritance may send 
money back home in order to maintain good relations with his/her parents and the family members.
At the macroeconomic level, various studies have attempted to gauge the role of these motives for 
remittances by examining factors that determine remittance inflows. A review of 17 empirical studies 
finds that the economic conditions in the source and recipient country and the migrant stock seem to 
be the dominant factors behind increased remittances (Hagen- Zanker & Siegel, 2007). This suggests 
that remittances would be larger for countries with a larger diaspora and when the diaspora is located 
in wealthier countries (Singh et al., 2011). Similarly, when deciding to remit, migrants respond more 
to the economic conditions of the host country relative to those of the home country (Vargas- Silva 
and Huang, 2006; Coulibaly, 2009). In another study, skilled migrants with greater capacity for higher 
earnings are found to be more likely to remit more, mitigating the negative impact of the brain drain 
effect in the origin country (Beine et al., 2008). However, countries that send a larger share of high- 
skilled migrants receive less in per capita remittances than countries that send a larger proportion of 
low- skilled migrants (Adams, 2009). Other important factors that encourage remittances are improved 
financial infrastructure (Ajide & Raheem, 2016; Ezeoha, 2013; Mallick, 2017; Mookerjee & Roberts, 
2011), quality of institutions (Ajide & Raheem, 2016; Lartey & Mengova, 2016) and lower exchange 
rate uncertainty (Higgins et al., 2004; Hysenbegasi & Pozo, 2008). Meanwhile, for factors such as 
GDP per capita, dependency ratio, interest rate, inflation and exchange rate (Azizi, 2019; Ezeoha, 
2013; Mallick, 2017; Ruiz & Vargas- Silva, 2009), the impact is generally found to be inconclusive.
In the past two decades, research on financial inflows has gathered momentum, covering a wide 
range of issues such as the formalisation of transfers, the reduction of the transfer costs of remittances, 
the relationship between remittances and financial sector development, the use of remittances for 
investment, the externalisation of remittance expenditure and the economic impact of remittances. 
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Remittances are now increasingly seen as a ‘new development mantra’ (Kapur, 2004). In an early 
study on the topic, Lueth and Ruiz- Arranz (2008) examine bilateral remittances for 11 countries in 
Asia and Europe for the period 1980– 2004 in order to determine the factors that drive those flows. 
Their results indicate that economic activity in the sending and recipient country and other gravity 
variables account for more than 50% of the variation in remittances. The study finds that underde-
veloped financial sectors in the home country may discourage remittances through formal channels. 
Distance, used as a proxy for financial transaction cost, is reported to have a negative effect on re-
mittance flows. Similarly, Frankel (2011), using the same dataset, finds that distance is negatively 
associated with remittances. McCracken et al. (2017) used bilateral remittances to 27 Latin American 
and Caribbean countries originating from 18 industrialised countries in a gravity setting. They find 
that greater geographical distance is associated with a lower volume of remittances. This negative 
correlation supports the information friction channel explanation, as greater distance increases the 
cost of monitoring how remittances are spent by raising the cost of trips back home or by reducing the 
frequency of phone calls due to differences in time zones.
Other studies fail to find the above- mentioned significant negative association between the volume 
and cost of remittances. De Sousa and Duval (2010), in a case study on Romania, observe that both 
recipient and sending countries’ economic size and geographical distance appear to impact bilateral 
flows positively. The relationship found between remittances and distance gives some support to the 
loan repayment hypothesis. In another study, using data on remittances from 21 Western European to 
7 neighbouring EU countries, Schiopu and Siegfried (2006) do not find evidence indicating that the 
cost of remittances, proxied by the number of Western Union agents per capita, explains remittance 
flows. However, the effect is positive for the pair of countries that do not share a common border, 
indicating that for those non- neighbouring countries more remittances are sent when the availability 
of financial services increases.
Departing from previous literature, Ahmed and Martínez- Zarzoso (2016) use the transaction cost 
of remitting to study its impact on remittance flows. Using bilateral data on remittance flows to 
Pakistan from 23 sending countries, the study finds a significant and negative effect of transaction cost 
on the remittance inflows, suggesting that higher transaction costs result in either a greater use of in-
formal channels for money transfer or the remitters refraining from sending money to their homes. The 
authors suggest that the reduction in transaction costs should both increase the remittance volume and 
enhance financial inclusion by redirecting the remittance flows from informal to formal channels. In 
a similar vein, Kakhkharov et al. (2017) investigate remittance flows to former Soviet Union countries 
by applying panel data techniques. They find that a reduction in transaction costs and depreciation of 
the currency in the sending country are the main factors that influence the growth of recorded remit-
tances. The negative relationship found between transaction costs and recorded remittances suggests 
that migrants switch from informal channels to formal ones in order to send remittances when costs 
are low. In an earlier study, Freund and Spatafora (2008) explore the determinants of remittances and 
their associated transaction costs— available for the year 2005 for a cross section of 102 developing 
countries— finding that recorded remittances depend positively on migrant stock and negatively on 
transaction cost4. When examining the determinants of the latter, they find that transfer costs are lower 
when financial systems are more developed and exchange rates are less volatile.
 4The effect is economically relevant, indicating that a one- percentage point increase in the fees is associated with a reduction 
in remittances of around 15%. However, these results are based on data for a single year and subject to endogeneity issues. 
When using instrumental variables, the magnitude of the effect increases to 20%, but the coefficient is only significant at the 
10% level.
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From this overview of the literature, we can see that the empirical evidence on the significance 
and direction of association between the volume of remittances and their cost is mixed, with results 
depending on the quantity and quality of data and the methodology employed. Until recently, an addi-
tional difficulty has been the lack of available cross- country longitudinal data on the cost of remitting.
3 |  MODEL, DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
3.1 | Model specification
The gravity model of trade has been widely used to analyse the effect of trade liberalisation policies 
and reductions of trade costs on bilateral trade flows. It has also been broadly applied to the analysis 
of other international flows such as FDI (Bénassy- Quéré et al., 2007; Demekas et al., 2005), interna-
tional migration (Lewer & van den Berg, 2008; Mayda, 2010) and equity holding and cross- border 
banking (Portes & Rey, 2005; and Brei & Von Peter, 2018). Its application to the analysis of interna-
tional remittances has been less common, but analogous to the concept of gravity in trade, bilateral 
remittance flows can also be mainly explained by the economic mass of the countries involved in the 
transaction, and relative frictions that limit the volume of transactions captured by transaction cost.
In this study, we employ an augmented gravity model in which bilateral remittance flows are 
explained by the GDPs of both the remittance- sending (i) and the recipient countries (j) and by the 
transaction cost (Transcostijt). The baseline empirical model builds on the literature that uses country- 
level data and cross- country regressions to explore the drivers of bilateral remittances using the grav-
ity model. We build on the approach proposed by Lueth and Ruiz- Arranz (2008) and Ahmed and 
Martínez- Zarzoso (2016) by taking natural logs of the original multiplicative gravity model.
The linearised gravity model of remittance flows from the sending (i) to recipient countries (j) in 
the year (t) is specified as follows:
where Remitijt indicates bilateral remittances (in natural logarithms) between the sending country i and the 
recipient country j at time t comprising funds classified as workers’ remittances, employee compensation, 
and migrant transfers. The explanatory variables GDPit and GDPjt stand for the gross domestic product 
of the sending country (i) and the recipient country (j) in period t. Transcostijt indicates the transaction 
cost of sending money from country i to country j. We take the cost of sending USD 200 as a percentage 
of the amount remitted as the main cost indicator. The cost of sending USD 500 is used for a robustness 
check. Stockmigijt denotes the stock of migrants from j that live in country i at time t. We include as explan-
atory variables the exchange rate stability (Exchrstab) in the sending and receiving countries as a proxy 
for financial risk, since Amuedo- Dorantes and Pozo (2004), El- Sakka and McNabb (1999), Freund and 
Spatafora (2008) and Faini (1994) find that exchange rate is a significant driver of remittance flows. µij 
denotes bilateral unobserved heterogeneity, which is alternately treated as fixed or random. In the former 
case, the time- invariant variables are dropped from the model due to the within transformation.
In addition to these factors, in some estimations we also include indicators of physical and cultural 
distance, which could represent the cost of acquiring information. Unlike goods, financial assets are 
‘weightless’ and hence distance is not a good proxy for transaction costs. Distance could however 
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close tend to know more about each other. Common language, common border (contiguity) and colo-
nial history are used to measure the cultural similarities between the countries i and j. Given that these 
factors are time- invariant, in some estimations we use a correlated random- effects (CRE) model that 
adds the means of the time- variant variables to the model and enables us to estimate the coefficients 
of the time- invariant variables.
We extend the baseline model by adding other sending and recipient country characteristics that 
are likely to influence the cross- border remittance flows. The extended model is given by:
In equation (2), the vector of control variables is represented by X, which includes, among other 
variables, exchange rate variables, liquid liabilities to GDP for both sending and recipient countries 
as a measure of financial development, and government stability proxied by institutional quality. All 
the variables except for dummies are in natural logs and their estimated coefficients can therefore be 
interpreted as elasticities. Model (2) is estimated using a generalised method of moments (GMM) 
estimator with fixed effects to account for the potential endogeneity of the target variable. The identi-
fication strategy is outlined in detail in subsection 3.3.
3.2 | Data and variables
The summary statistics of the main variables used in the empirical analysis are shown in Table 1. 
Table A1 shows the description of the variables used in the estimations, units of measurement and 
sources of the data used. The list of sending and receiving countries included in the dataset is shown 
in Table A2 in the Appendix.
Bilateral remittances received by country i from country j in current US dollars are estimated by 
the World Bank using the method described in Ratha and Shaw (2007). Annual remittance matri-
ces are combined to generate the bilateral remittances panel for the period 2011– 2017. The bilateral 
migration data used in this study come from two distinct sources. The starting point is the bilateral 
migration stocks for destination countries by major countries of origin retrieved from the United 
Nations Population Division. The calculations are based on the 2015 and 2017 bilateral migration 
matrices. The second step involves a collection of similar immigration data from the OECD Database 
on Migration to obtain data on stocks of emigrants from various developing countries living in OECD 
countries. These two datasets are merged to generate an indicator of migrant stocks for both OECD 
and non- OECD countries for the period 2011– 2017.
Data for remittance costs are taken from Remittance Prices Worldwide (RPW), a database man-
aged by the World Bank. The transaction cost data are available on a quarterly basis for different 
channels such as banks, MTOs, post offices and mobile phones. We constructed an indicator for the 
average transaction cost of sending USD 200 and USD 500. The total cost charged by a provider in-
cludes the remittance transaction fee and the implicit exchange rate cost that applies when the remit-
tance transactions are paid in local currencies (computed in this database when the foreign exchange 










 5The implicit exchange rate cost is the difference between the exchange rate used by the provider and the central exchange 
rate as reported by Bloomberg (also called exchange rate spread).
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Figure 1 shows that, starting in 2015, remittance costs have decreased steadily, potentially due to 
the entry of new players in the market, new technologies supporting digital payments and the prog-
ress made in improving financial inclusion. The cost of sending remittances varies substantially. For 
instance, South Asia had the lowest cost of around 5.2% in 2017, which represents a drop of about 24 
percentage points from the level of 6.8% estimated for the year 2011. Similarly, the cost of remitting 
declined in all regions from 2016 to 2017, with the notable exception of sub- Saharan Africa (SSA). 
SSA remains the most expensive corridor for remittances, with an average cost stubbornly hovering 
around 12% in 2011– 2012 and 9.4% in 2017. Despite the declining trends seen in recent years, the 
average cost of sending USD 200 still exceeds the SDG goal of 3%; for example, the cost of sending 
to East Asia and Pacific (EAP) is around 8.5%, 7.5% to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), 
7.2% to Europe and Central Asia and 6.2% to Latin America and the Caribbean (Figure 1).
The scatter plots in Figures A1 and A2 in the Appendix show the relationship between remittance 
flows and the cost of sending USD 200, in natural logs, for the years 2011 and 2017, respectively. The 
figures suggest that lower costs of remitting are associated with higher amounts of formal remittances. 
Similarly, the large cluster of observations around high remittance shares seems to be associated with 
low costs of remitting; to some extent, this could indicate the existence of a scale effect, given that 
remittance costs are lower in high- volume corridors.
Table A3 shows the correlation matrix for the variables included in the study. We observe that 
remittances are positively correlated with most of the variables, but negatively correlated with liquid 
liabilities in the sending country and transaction cost. The highest correlation for remittances is with 
the stock of migrants (0.76). Strong correlations are also found with other economic and financial 
T A B L E  1  Descriptive summary statistics
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min Max
ln(Remit) 1643 5.74 1.78 −5.74 10.31
ln(Remit per migrant) 1153 7.84 1.11 1.52 11.15
ln(Remit per capita) 1643 2.04 2.03 −9.72 7.46
ln(Trans. cost 200) 1365 2.00 0.48 0.24 3.18
ln(Trans. cost 500) 1363 1.52 0.48 −0.22 2.92
ln(Distance) 1673 8.35 0.77 5.75 9.83
ln(Stock of migrants) 1160 −2.12 1.39 −7.47 2.54
ln(GDP_PPP)i 1701 14.35 1.27 10.85 16.79
ln(GDP_PPP)j 1694 12.54 2.18 6.28 16.96
Exc. rate stabi 1701 0.94 0.10 0.38 1.00
Exc. rate stabj 1526 0.92 0.14 0.08 1.00
ln(Bilateral exchange rate) 1636 3.40 2.64 −5.33 10.26
ln(liquid liabilities to GDPi) 1336 4.49 0.37 3.56 5.38
ln(liquid liabilities to GDPj) 1417 3.98 0.62 2.33 5.49
Border 1673 0.05 0.23 0.00 1.00
Language 1673 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00
Colony 1673 0.15 0.35 0.00 1.00
Institi 1701 0.59 0.24 0.00 1.00
Institj 1526 0.58 0.15 0.00 1.00
Note: Definitions and data sources of the variables are given in Table A1.
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indicators (cost, sending and receiving country GDP, exchange rate stability and liquid liabilities), 
whereas they are weak for institutional and cultural indicators. An interesting observation is that cost 
is strongly correlated only with remittances and migrant stock and not with financial development or 
national output.
3.3 | Empirical strategy
A variety of empirical techniques are employed in the study. The model is first estimated using the 
standard fixed effects model (FEM) based on the Hausman test result, which indicates that the country 
fixed effects are correlated with the regressors (p- value = 0.003). A random- effects estimator (REM) 
would therefore yield biased results. The FEM is a consistent approach to deal with unobservable 
country pair effects. However, it does not provide a direct estimation of the coefficients of time- 
invariant variables as it uses a within transformation to eliminate the time- invariant unobservable 
country effects, which also wipes out all explanatory variables that are time- invariant, such as geo-
graphical distance and common language. In this case, no statistical inference can be made for these 
variables if they are included in the original model based on the theory. This is in contrast to REM, 
which rests upon the strong assumption of exogeneity of all explanatory variables with respect to the 
error term. The solution we adopt is to use the CRE method proposed by Mundlak (1978), which uses 
F I G U R E  1  Regional overview of the costs of sending USD 200 (2011 and 2017). 
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a linear projection of the time- invariant unobserved heterogeneity to relax the strong exogeneity as-
sumption. The CRE method is easily implemented in practice by augmenting the REM with the mean 
of the explanatory variables that change over time (Wooldridge, 2010). It can be shown that the coef-
ficients of the time- varying explanatory variables are identical to the FEM estimates (Wooldridge, 
2010).
Nevertheless, it is still possible that transaction costs are endogenous to remittances; failing to ac-
count for this in the model might result in biased estimates. Remittances may cause shifts in transac-
tion costs; in other words, market size or economies of scale might also have important effects (Beck 
& Martínez Pería, 2011; Freund & Spatafora, 2008). Higher remittance flows reduce transaction fees 
through greater competition in larger markets or returns to scale. In this case, there would be an iden-
tification problem due to reverse causality. It is also possible that economic or socio- political variables 
omitted from our model may affect both the volume and cost of remitting. The most common method 
to deal with the endogeneity problem is to implement an IV strategy. Consequently, we continue our 
analysis using a two- step GMM estimator with fixed effects in order to overcome the potential endog-
eneity6. We also perform the Durbin– Wu– Hausman test for endogeneity. A small p- value (0.029) in-
dicates that the explanatory variable is correlated with the error term, implying that endogeneity is 
present. In such a case, estimates using ordinary least square (OLS) would be inconsistent and an IV 
approach is recommended (Baum et al., 2003, 2007). When applying the IV strategy, the main chal-
lenge is to find suitable instruments for the variables that are endogenous to the model.
External instruments should be correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable but should not 
directly affect the dependent variable. An early example of the use of an IV approach in the migration 
literature can be found in Altonji and Card (1991) and Card (2001), who instrument current migration 
with settlement patterns of previous migrants when examining the labour effects of immigration. The 
underlying assumption is that pull factors which attracted immigrants in the past are uncorrelated with 
current local demand shocks. In line with this literature, we construct a number of instruments for re-
mittance cost. These include the share of country i's migrant stock in country j's population interacted 
with indicators of financial access, namely, bank branches per 100,000 adults and ATMs per 100,000 
adults in the sending country, as well as speed of the transfers. The reason for choosing these instru-
ments lies in the fact that origin- specific immigrant networks are considered an important determinant 
of remittance transfer fees (Beck & Martínez Pería, 2011; Freund & Spatafora, 2008). A higher con-
centration of migrants from a certain country means that there tend to be more remittance services for 
the remittance corridor in question and greater competition among service providers, leading to lower 
costs. The indicators of financial access in the sending country also represent the ease with which 
migrants can use formal remittance services which, in turn, affects the transfer fees charged by the 
service providers. Following Altonji and Card (1991) and Card (2001), our instruments are defined as:
where migig2011 denotes the immigrants from country j residing in country i as a share of the total popula-
tion of country i in the initial year of the sample period (2011) interacted with financial access indicators 
(bank branches per 100,000 adults and ATMs per 100,000 adults) in country i. As an additional external 
instrument, we use the speed of delivery of the transfers. This is an important factor that migrants consider 
when selecting the remittance channel. The longer it takes to process a transaction, the more likely mi-
grants are to use alternative channels to remit money (Ferriani & Oddo, 2019). Remittance channels differ 
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widely in terms of accessibility and speed, with the latter often positively associated with transfer charges. 
The speed of the transfer, defined as the time needed for the remittance to be available for the receiver, is 
standardised in six broad categories: < 1 h, same day, next day, 2 days, 3– 5 days and 6 days or more, with 
the categories ranked from 1 to 6, respectively.
The outcome of the Hansen test for over- identification indicates that the null hypothesis that all 
our instruments are valid cannot be rejected. We use robust standard errors clustered at the corridor 
level throughout the analysis in order to control for arbitrary groupwise heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlation.
4 |  MAIN RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Table 2 shows models with pair FE in columns (1), (3) and (5) and with correlated RE in columns (2), 
(4) and (6). These last three models include distance, common language, colonial past and common 
border variables. The results indicate that none of these variables are statistically significant. In con-
trast, the association between the cost of remitting USD 200 and the amounts remitted is always statis-
tically significant and with the expected negative sign. The coefficient for the cost variable indicates 
that a 1% decrease in the cost of remitting increases the amount of remittances sent by about 0.24%. 
Finally, in columns (5) and (6) of Table 2 we used for comparison the bilateral exchange rate variable 
instead of the exchange rate stability variables used in the main model. This variable is found to have 
a positive association with remittances, indicating that migrants remit more in foreign currency as the 
domestic currency depreciates. This finding is in line with Singh et al. (2011), who report that depre-
ciation of the recipient country's currency increases remittance flows, as it translates into more local 
currency per unit of foreign currency. Likewise, the World Bank (2012) argue that an unexpected 
depreciation of the home country currency can lead to a major surge in remittances as migrants remit 
their savings to purchase land, houses and other durable assets back home.
In Table 3, we present the results7 obtained by using a GMM estimator that accounts for the poten-
tial endogeneity of the target variable, transaction cost, gradually adding the control variables indi-
cated in Section 3. The estimated model corresponds to specification (2) in the same section. Time FE 
are included in all columns to model specific unobservable time effects, and country fixed effects are 
added to account for unobserved heterogeneity that is time- invariant. The coefficient of remittance 
cost for remitting USD 200 is negative and statistically significant, and its magnitude increases dra-
matically in comparison to the results obtained when the model is estimated as specified in equation 
(1), that is, with FE and CRE (Table 2).
When endogeneity is taken into account, a 1% decrease in the cost of remitting increases remit-
tances by about 1.57%, that is, more than proportionally. The elasticity of transaction cost is over six 
times that shown in columns (3) and (4) of Table 2, indicating a substantial underestimation in the 
baseline results. This result is obtained using three external instruments; namely, the number of bank 
branches and the number of ATMs in the sending country both interacted with the migrant stock in 
the initial year of the sample period, and the speed of remitting. We test for weak instruments and for 
the exclusion restriction of the validity of the instruments used. The results of the tests indicate that 
the instruments are not weak (the F test of the first- step regression is higher than 10). The exclusion 
restriction cannot be rejected since the Hansen test probability is higher than 0.10.
Next, we control for a number of macroeconomic, financial and institutional factors in both the 
sending and the receiving countries. Column (2) in Table 3 shows estimations including indicators 
 7Note the reduction in the number of observations in Table 3 due to missing data in the external instruments used.
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for exchange rate stability in origin and destination countries. The results show that the impact of ex-
change rate stability on remittances is statistically significant in the case of the receiving country, but 
is not always for the sending country. In other words, a country with a stable exchange rate receives 
higher remittance inflows, while the stability of the sending- country exchange rate does not play a 
significant role in driving remittances.
In Column (3), we control for the degree of financial development in the countries involved in the 
transaction. A competitive financial system in either the migrant's home or host country facilitates 
T A B L E  2  Remittances and transaction cost: baseline estimations
Dependent variable: ln 




ln (Trans.cost 200) −0.24** −0.24** −0.22*** −0.22***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08)
ln(Distance) 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
ln(GDP_PPP)i 0.85 0.85 1.22 1.22 0.55 0.55
(0.71) (0.72) (0.81) (0.81) (0.73) (0.73)
ln(GDP_PPP)j 0.30 0.30 0.41 0.41 0.96
*** 0.96***
(0.22) (0.22) (0.29) (0.29) (0.31) (0.32)
ln(Stock of migrants) 0.20* 0.20* 0.23* 0.23* 0.29** 0.29**
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14)
Border 0.34 0.08 −0.01
(0.37) (0.29) (0.35)
Language 0.03 0.13 0.11
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Colony 0.09 −0.04 −0.27
(0.21) (0.21) (0.20)
ln(Bil. exchange rate) 0.79** 0.79**
(0.32) (0.32)
Exc. rate stabi −0.12 −0.12 −0.18 −0.18
(0.13) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15)
Exc. rate stabj 0.37
** 0.37** 0.46*** 0.46***
(0.14) (0.15) (0.16) (0.17)
Observations 1,071 1,071 924 924 981 981
R2 0.407 0.707 0.418 0.714 0.300 0.706
Number of pairs 217 217 217 217 232 232
Pair FE (fixed or random) YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models regress the natural log of bilateral remittances. Models 1, 3 and 5 show two- way 
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formal fund transfers (Acosta et al., 2009; Giuliano & Ruiz- Arranz, 2009; Mallick, 2017; Ratha, 2005; 
Suro et al., 2002). Recipient countries with well- developed and technologically advanced financial 
institutions attract larger remittance inflows through formal channels (Kemegue et al., 2011).
According to some authors, one of the reasons why remittance inflows to SSA have remained 
largely informal is the limited presence of the formal financial sector (Mohapatra & Ratha, 2011; Page 
& Plaza, 2006). Following King and Levine (1993) and Bettin and Zazzaro (2012), we use the ratio 
of liquid liabilities of the banking sector to GDP (also called broad money or M3) as a proxy for the 
financial depth of the country. In line with the literature, we find a positive effect of financial sector 
T A B L E  3  Remittances and transaction cost (USD 200): FE- IV estimations
Dependent variable: ln 
(Remit) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Explanatory variables
ln(Trans. Cost 200) −1.57** −1.62*** −1.54*** −0.91**
(0.63) (0.61) (0.58) (0.44)
ln(GDP_PPP)i 1.55
* 1.72* 2.72*** 3.40***
(0.81) (0.96) (1.02) (0.89)
ln(GDP_PPP)j 1.09
* 0.71 0.77 0.50
(0.62) (0.64) (0.69) (0.64)
ln(Stock of migrants) 0.66*** 0.59** 0.56** 0.44**
(0.22) (0.23) (0.22) (0.18)
Exc. Rate stabi 0.97
* 0.83 0.05
(0.58) (0.51) (0.48)
Exc. Rate stabj 0.57
** 0.74*** 0.65**
(0.29) (0.28) (0.27)
ln(liquid liabilities to GDPi) 2.31
*** 2.80***
(0.73) (0.65)








Observations 413 383 362 362
Number of pairs 92 86 78 78
Hansen (Prob) 0.548 0.315 0.345 0.606
Pair FE YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable: natural log of bilateral remittances. The models use a two- step GMM with 
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depth on remittance inflows. The effect is significant for the financial sector of both the sending and 
receiving countries, although the impact is stronger in the case of the sending countries.
Moreover, we add controls for the quality of institutions. Column (4) shows the results of the es-
timation including political stability as an additional control variable. Stability of the political setup 
can influence remittance inflows in different ways. On the one hand, improvements in government 
effectiveness can reinforce migrants’ confidence in the country's institutions and increase investment- 
motivated remittances (Lartey & Mengova, 2016). On the other hand, political instability, social unrest 
and conflict situations can encourage migrants to contribute to the stay- behind household members’ 
financial well- being, the so- called altruistic motive for remittances (Mughal & Anwar, 2015). We use 
the ICRG political stability index based on indicators of government stability, investment profile and 
socioeconomic conditions. We find that a lower level of stability is associated with a rise in remit-
tances. The association, however, is significant only for the sending countries. In all the estimations 
with additional controls (Columns 2– 4), the coefficient for remittance cost retains its negative sign 
with significance at the 1 or 5% level. The elasticities range from 0.91 to 1.62.
5 |  ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
Table 4 presents a number of additional robustness checks. Column (1) shows the results of estima-
tions regressing remittance flows on the cost of remitting USD 500 instead of USD 200, while column 
(2) shows results from regressions that use the cost of remitting USD 500 in levels (without taking 
natural logs). As before, the signs of the transaction cost coefficients are negative and the magnitudes 
of the coefficients are not dissimilar when they are made comparable. The association between remit-
tance amount and cost of remitting USD 500, however, is not statistically significant. This finding 
indicates that transfer fees are a significant determinant of the amount of money the migrants send, but 
only for relatively small amounts. For larger amounts, cost does not seem to be a constraint. Money 
transfer services, especially those offered by banks, charge fixed fees which prove exorbitant for 
small remittances. Another possible explanation lies in the diverse uses to which different amounts 
of remittances are dedicated. A large number of international migrants send small amounts to their 
families back home on a frequent basis. These remittances are often meant to cover the households’ 
everyday needs and are highly sensitive to the costs incurred. However, some migrants, usually those 
based permanently in the host countries, remit large sums to their countries of origin. These infrequent 
transfers are less sensitive to transfer fees and are meant for investing in real estate or other commer-
cial ventures, or contributing to philanthropic causes.
In columns (3) to (5), we present three additional alternative estimations to check the robustness of 
our main findings. Column (3) uses the current stock of immigrants as the interacted instrument in-
stead of the initial migrant stock. Columns (4) and (5) replace remittance with remittance per migrant 
and remittance per capita as dependent variables, respectively. Once again, the association in all three 
estimations remains significant with a negative sign. In fact, the coefficients of the target variable, 
transaction cost, in columns (4) and (5) show slightly higher magnitude and lower standard errors than 
the baseline coefficients in column (3).
Another robustness test consists of splitting the sample according to the level of bilateral remit-
tances and comparing the impact of transaction costs on remittances across sub- samples (see Table 5). 
We test whether high- volume corridors drive the results by restricting the sample to three (columns 1 
and 2) and five (columns 3 and 4) major corridors for each recipient country in the sample. The results 
indicate that the coefficient of remittance cost remains negative and significant. The results for the top 
three and top five corridors are very similar. Conversely, when major corridors are excluded from the 
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T A B L E  4  Remittances and transaction cost: additional estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent 
variables
ln(Remit) ln(Remit) ln(Remit) Remit /Mig. Remit/Pop.
Explanatory variables
ln(Trans. cost 200) −0.710* −0.985** −0.872**
(0.410) (0.500) (0.439)
ln(Trans. cost 500) −1.444
(1.476)





*** 3.344*** 3.204*** 2.632*** 3.264***
(1.550) (0.850) (0.840) (0.946) (0.881)
ln(GDP_PPP)j 1.233 0.652 0.385 0.281 0.463
(1.116) (0.718) (0.624) (0.656) (0.633)
ln(Stock of 
migrants)
0.586* 0.434** 0.376** 0.421**
(0.325) (0.220) (0.168) (0.176)
Exc. rate stabi 0.00556 −0.258 0.0465 0.267 0.0909
(0.690) (0.496) (0.479) (0.555) (0.483)
Exc. rate stabj 0.675
* 0.590* 0.589** 0.783*** 0.651**
(0.343) (0.322) (0.278) (0.282) (0.275)
ln(liquid liabilities 
to GDPi)
3.227*** 2.619*** 2.746*** 2.167*** 2.632***
(0.996) (0.607) (0.624) (0.676) (0.641)
ln(liquid liabilities 
to GDPj)
1.007 0.653 0.676** 0.979*** 0.782**
(0.664) (0.469) (0.311) (0.333) (0.321)
Institi −1.398
** −0.951*** −0.770*** −0.709*** −0.762***
(0.687) (0.351) (0.223) (0.242) (0.227)
Institj −0.339 −0.329 −0.266 −0.410 −0.224
(0.383) (0.292) (0.307) (0.333) (0.297)
Observations 362 362 362 362 362
Number of pairs 78 78 78 78 78
Pair FE YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES
Hansen (prob.) 0.279 0.108 0.180 0.186 0.619
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The models use a two- step GMM with fixed effects (stata command xtivreg2). Instruments 
include: instr1 = bank_bra_hos * migst2011, instr2 = atm_hos * migst2011, and instr3 = speed of transfer, except for Model 3 which 
uses the current stock of immigrants as the interacted instrument instead of initial migrant stock. Model 1 regresses remittance flows 
on the cost of remitting USD 500 instead of USD 200. Model 2 regresses remittances on the cost of remitting USD 500 without taking 




16 |   AHMED Et Al.
sample, the estimates of the target coefficients are not found to be statistically significant, indicating a 
lack of evidence to support the relevance of remittance costs for smaller corridors.
As a further robustness check, we examine whether or not the remittance- enhancing effect of a re-
duction in transfer charges is valid for receiving countries regardless of the size of remittance inflows. 
In our dataset, the median amount of remittances received was USD 329.42 million. Columns (5) and 
(6) in Table 5 show estimations carried out on the sub- samples of receiving countries with above- and 
below- median remittance inflows, respectively. Overall, the results reinforce our previous findings. 
More specifically, we find that the impact of remittance costs is negative for both groups of countries. 
However, it is significant only for the countries receiving above- median amounts of remittances, sug-
gesting that the costs involved fall once remittance flows reach sufficient volumes.
T A B L E  5  Sub- sample regressions for top versus non- top remittance corridors
Dependent variable: ln 
(Remit) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Explanatory variables
ln(Trans. cost 200) −0.65*** −0.50 −0.76*** −0.02 −0.62** −0.46
(0.21) (0.78) (0.28) (0.23) (0.27) (0.44)
ln(GDP_PPP)i 6.53
*** 1.30 6.15*** 1.30* 2.80*** 10.69**
(1.58) (1.25) (1.37) (0.71) (0.69) (4.38)
ln(GDP_PPP)j 1.37 −1.06 0.91 −0.85 −0.17 −0.19
(0.86) (1.21) (0.74) (0.65) (0.51) (1.17)
Exc. rate stabi −0.34 0.02 −0.12 −0.10 0.22 −0.91
(0.56) (0.80) (0.51) (0.32) (0.35) (1.04)
Exc. rate stabj 0.65
** 0.64 0.68** 0.32* 0.25* 0.94**
(0.30) (0.57) (0.30) (0.19) (0.14) (0.43)
ln(liquid liabilities to 
GDPi)
3.70*** 1.12 3.43*** 1.45* 2.27*** 6.91***
(0.89) (1.38) (0.72) (0.85) (0.57) (2.57)
ln(liquid liabilities to 
GDPj)
0.71** 0.47 0.84** 0.17 0.54*** 1.53
(0.28) (0.80) (0.40) (0.25) (0.19) (1.20)
Institi −1.02
*** −0.35 −0.94*** −0.32* −0.34** −1.93***
(0.27) (0.36) (0.27) (0.17) (0.15) (0.67)
Institj 0.26 −0.61 0.22 −0.25 −0.01 −0.01
(0.36) (0.52) (0.35) (0.31) (0.23) (0.67)
Observations 230 147 283 94 250 127
Number of pairs 50 30 62 18 50 30
Pair FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Hansen (prob.) 0.232 0.289 0.119 0.293 0.142 0.0301
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The models use a two- step GMM with fixed effects (stata command xtivreg2). Instruments 
include: instr1 = bank_bra_hos * migst2011, instr2 = atm_hos * migst2011, and instr3 = speed of transfer. Model 1 presents the 
results for the top three corridors, while model 2 excludes these three. Model 3 includes only the top five corridors and model 4 
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6 |  CONCLUSIONS
One of the targets of SDG 10 is to bring down the cost of remitting to 3% globally by 2030, that is, less 
than half of today's level. In this study, we examine the extent to which reductions in remittance costs 
drive formal remittance flows. We used data on bilateral remittances for 30 sending and 75 receiving 
countries for the period 2011– 2017 to estimate a gravity model of remittances applying panel data and 
instrumental variables approaches. The main results suggest that a reduction in remittance costs has 
a substantial impact on the amount of remittances received by developing countries. In particular, we 
found that a 1% drop in the cost of transferring USD 200 is associated with as much as a 1.6% increase 
in remittance inflows. The magnitude of the impact is substantially lower when using standard panel 
data techniques that do not address endogeneity issues. Moreover, the beneficial effect found for the 
transfer of small amounts does not extend to larger ones, indicating the presence of a scale effect. 
We also find that physical distance between the two countries— the indicator commonly used in the 
literature to proxy for transaction cost— does not significantly affect remittance flows; it can therefore 
be considered a poor proxy for transaction cost.
Given that remittances are an economic lifeline for many developing economies, the main findings 
highlight the need for sustained efforts in the international policy arena to reduce transaction costs. 
Reducing the cost of remitting from the current level of 7% to the 3% target would lead to almost 
double the volume of formal remittances. If this cost reduction can be achieved, international mi-
gration would become a more effective tool for fostering development by ensuring that stay- behind 
households in developing countries receive a greater share of the money sent by the migrant abroad. 
In addition, enhancing migrants’ access to formal banking services will not only add to the depth of 
formal financial markets, but also improve the receiving country's balance of payments.
Lowering the cost of remitting and thereby increasing remittance inflows can additionally have 
an impact in terms of reducing economic inequalities. We found that the remittance- increasing effect 
of cost reductions is mainly observed for small transfers. Since such transfers tend to be made by 
temporary, low- income migrant workers sending money home on a frequent basis, lower remittance 
costs will allow them to remit more through formal channels. Governments can play a key role in 
this regard by promoting competition among the money transfer operators and banking institutions. 
This is especially critical in contexts where anti- money laundering and terror- financing regulations 
have raised the cost of monitoring clients and their financial transactions, which particularly affects 
small financial institutions. Therefore, ensuring a level- playing field for all the players in the formal 
financial market can help keep costs down. Another policy approach to reduce the cost of remitting 
could consist of improving the transparency and comparability of remittance services pricing, for ex-
ample by maintaining an updated online register of the prices charged for various remittance products. 
Finally, providing better information to migrants and their stay- behind families about these pricing 
mechanisms, as well as helping them to make more informed decisions, can increase the use of less- 
costly remittance services.
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APPENDIX 1






We take remittances received by country i from country j in current US 
dollars in a given period. The Ratha and Shaw (2007) method used for 
the construction of the Bilateral Remittance Matrix involves allocating a 
country's total remittance inflows in a given year to its emigrant stocks 
estimated in the Bilateral Migration Matrix, adjusting for the migrant- 
sending and receiving countries’ per capita income. The World Bank 
uses two datasets to construct the Bilateral Remittance Matrix. The first 
is the UN Population Division estimates of migrant stock by country of 
origin and destination, also used by this tool. The second dataset used in 
the construction of the Bilateral Remittance Matrix is remittance inflows 
data constructed as the sum of two components of the IMF’s Balance 
of Payments Statistics: (i) employee compensation and (ii) personal 
transfers. A country's total remittance inflows in a given year are 
allocated to its emigrant stocks, adjusting for the migrant- sending and 
receiving countries’ per capita income. We collect Bilateral Remittance 
Matrix data for each year from 2010 to 2017. To finalise the data for 
bilateral remittances from 2010 to 2017, we first cleaned the data for 








200 and USD 
500: Trans. 
cost 200 and 
Trans. cost 
500
The World Bank Payment Systems Group has compiled the Remittance 
Prices Worldwide (RPW) database for the first quarter of 2011 onwards. 
The source countries are usually developed countries, but there are also 
some developing countries. To control for exchange rate fluctuations 
and other changes in fee structures, the data were gathered on the same 
day in each corridor. The cost data were gathered for 8 to 10 major 
service providers in each corridor, including both the leading money 
transfer operators (MTOs) and banks active in the remittances market. 
For each corridor, firm and product available, the RPW database 
provides the transfer costs for two amounts of money remitted, that 
is USD 200 and USD 500. The mean cost of sending USD200 and 
USD500 is 8.22 and 5.09%, respectively
We convert the data from quarterly to yearly and average the total costs 
from different MTOs and banks. The total costs charged by a provider 
are made up of remittance fees as well as the exchange rate spread 
component. Logically, the transaction cost, as a share of the amount 
remitted, decreases (though not proportionally) with the amount of 
money sent, indicating that the cost structure is a mix of fixed and 
variable costs. In general, the type of product has a similar impact for 
either amount sent, but the USD 200 transfer has a higher variance. For 
instance, the variance of USD 200 is 15.18— about three times higher 

















We used two datasets for migrant stocks. The first one is the most 
comprehensive source of information on International Migrant Stock 
retrieved from the United Nations, Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, Population Division. We take the stock of migrant workers in 
the destination country by origin for the years 2010, 2015, and 2017. 
The second dataset is compiled by OECD International Migration Data 
and covers the period starting from 2001. We gather the data on stock 
of foreign- born population by country of birth from 2010 to 2017. The 
OECD datasets cover only migrants residing in the OECD. We merge 
OECD data on international migrant stock with the UN- DESA dataset 
to impute the missing cells





GDP at PPP prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident 
producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any 








The appreciation or depreciation of a currency against the US dollar over 
a calendar year or the most recent 12- month period, calculated as a 


































100,000*reported number of commercial bank branches/adult population 






T A B L E  A 1  (Continued)
(Continues)








The sum of currency and deposits in the central bank (M0), transferable 
deposits and electronic currency (M1), time and savings deposits, 
foreign currency transferable deposits, certificates of deposit and 
securities repurchase agreements (M2) and traveller's checks, foreign 
currency time deposits, commercial paper, and shares of mutual funds 









Composite index of government stability based on government stability, 
investment profile, and socioeconomic condition, with a higher score 
indicating more stability. The values are normalised to the range 0– 1
PRS/ICRG
T A B L E  A 1  (Continued)
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T A B L E  A 2  List of sending and receiving countries
Sending countries Receiving countries
Australia Albania Kenya Suriname
Austria Algeria Kosovo Swaziland
Bahrain Angola Kyrgyz Republic Tajikistan
Belgium Armenia Lebanon Tanzania
Brazil Bangladesh Lesotho Thailand
Canada Bolivia Liberia Togo
Chile Bosnia and Herzegovina Macedonia Tonga
Czech Republic Botswana Madagascar Tunisia
France Brazil Malawi Turkey
Germany Bulgaria Malaysia Uganda
Israel Cameroon Mali Ukraine
Italy China Mexico Vanuatu
Japan Colombia Moldova Vietnam
Kuwait Comoros Morocco Yemen
Malaysia Costa Rica Mozambique Zambia
Netherlands Dominican Republic Myanmar
New Zealand Ecuador Nepal
Norway Egypt Nicaragua
Oman El Salvador Nigeria
Portugal Ethiopia Pakistan
Qatar Fiji Peru
Saudi Arabia Ghana Philippines
Singapore Guatemala Romania
South Africa Guyana Rwanda
Spain Haiti Samoa
Sweden Honduras Senegal
Switzerland India Sierra Leone
United Arab Emirates Indonesia South Africa
United Kingdom Jamaica Sri Lanka
United States Jordan Sudan
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F I G U R E  A 1  Transaction cost and bilateral remittances, 2011.
S O U R C E :  R E M I T T A N C E  P R I C E S  W O R L D W I D E  A N D  R E M I T T A N C E S  D A T A 
C O M E  F R O M  T H E  W O R L D  B A N K .







































































1.5 2 2.5 3
ln(Cost of sending 200 USD), 2011
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F I G U R E  A 2  Transaction cost and bilateral remittances, 2017.
S O U R C E :  R E M I T T A N C E  P R I C E S  W O R L D W I D E  A N D  R E M I T T A N C E S  A R E 
T A K E N  F R O M  T H E  W O R L D  B A N K .
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ln(Cost of sending 200 USD), 2017
